Conceptual Engineering and Sex

Iñigo Valero

doi:10.14394/filnau.2023.0016

Autor

Iñigo Valero University of the Basque Country (UPV-EHU), Faculty of Education, Philosophy and Anthropology https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5088-6178

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2023.0016

Słowa kluczowe:

sex, binary, conceptual engineering, pluralism, dilemma

Abstrakt

Current debates on the nature of human biological sex often revolve around the question “Is sex binary?” In this paper, I argue that framing the debate in these terms is problematic as it already constitutes a significant theoretical commitment which results in oversimplistic characterizations of human sex. I argue, thus, that neither the positive nor the negative answer to the question “Is sex binary?” is satisfactory and that a more nuanced approach is required. More positively, I suggest that conceptual engineering provides promising tools to engage in this debate more fruitfully and transparently. Finally, I defend conceptual pluralism about human biological sex, the view according to which the term ‘sex’ may be legitimately paired with more than one concept of sex.

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