Putnam i jego argument teoriomodelowy. Polemiczne uwagi do Jana Woleńskiego krytyki antyrealizmu semantycznego

Abstrakt

This paper examines a pro-realist interpretation of Hilary Putnam’s so-called Model-Theoretic Argument (against the metaphysical realism) put forward by Jan Woleński in his monograph Epistemologia. We argue that neither the mutual rela-tionships between theories and their models nor the objective of Putnam’s argument, nor the role of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem in this argument were adequately grasped by the author of Epistemologia. In particular, we point out that Woleński’s interpretation is too literal (with respect to the problem of relationships between theories and their models) and simply unsound. We also intend to show that the Model-Theoretic Argument is much more elusive than it can be observed from a realist point of view.