Struktury uzasadniania. Część II. Fundacjonizm

  • Jacek Ziobrowski Szkoła Główna Handlowa
Słowa kluczowe: structure of justification, foundationalism, basic beliefs, Laurence BonJour, Robert Audi

Abstrakt

This paper is the second part of a series of articles concerning the structure of justification. The author discusses foundationalism — the most often adopted position on this issue. He distinguishes different kinds of this position and points out the main objections against it. General considerations concerning foundationalism are illustrated by solutions included in the theories of “the late” Laurence BonJour and Robert Audi.

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Opublikowane
2018-06-30
© University of Warsaw. All rights reserved.
Jak cytować
Ziobrowski, J. (2018). Struktury uzasadniania. Część II. Fundacjonizm. Filozofia Nauki, 26(2), 95-118. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0012