Modalny argument na rzecz dualizmu w ujęciu Uwe Meixnera

  • Mariusz Grygianiec Institute of Philosophy, University of Augsburg
Słowa kluczowe: Meixner, modal argument, physicalism, dualism, conceivable, possible, coherent, scenario

Abstrakt

The paper provides a critical analysis of Uwe Meixner’s modal argument in favour of psychophysical dualism. It delivers, first, a formal reconstruction of the proof which was originally presented by Meixner in 2004, second, a detailed scrutiny of some premises of the argument in question, and third, a careful assessment of the whole reasoning. My analysis aims at justifying the belief that although the version of the modal argument invented by Meixner is formally valid and represents a significant progress when compared with the original version, it is still based on two disputable premises which make the whole reasoning difficult to regard, in a completely collision-free way, as a materially sound one.
Opublikowane
2016-12-01
Jak cytować
Grygianiec, M. (2016). Modalny argument na rzecz dualizmu w ujęciu Uwe Meixnera. Filozofia Nauki, 24(4), 129-147.