O argumencie Corazzy przeciw pojęciu myśli zależnej od przedmiotu

  • Aleksander Latkowski Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski
Słowa kluczowe: object-dependent thought, perceptual knowledge, psychological generalization, structured proposition, direct reference

Abstrakt

The aim of the article is to prove that the concept of an object-dependent thought withstands the critique put forward by Eros Corazza. In the first section of the article I present and elaborate on the concept of object-dependent thought, formulated for the first time by Gareth Evans. In the second section I present Corazza’s criticism of this concept and point to the fact — not emphasized enough by Corazza — that it may be understood in two different ways: methodological and ontological. In the final part of the article I defend the concept of object-dependent thoughts. I show that ontological intuitions are not a sufficient ground for the refutation of the concept, since this would mean that they need to be strengthened with methodological assumptions. Those assumptions however — in the light of my argumentation — do not seem justified.
Opublikowane
2016-09-01
Jak cytować
Latkowski, A. (2016). O argumencie Corazzy przeciw pojęciu myśli zależnej od przedmiotu. Filozofia Nauki, 24(3), 43-72.