Semantyka warunków prawdziwości i problem ekstensjonalności

  • Cezary Cieśliński Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski

Abstrakt

In this essay the problem which logically equivalent sentences present to a Tarski-style truth conditional semantics is disscused. The difficulty is that we can obtain deviant theorems which follow by logic alone from our truth theory. After criticizing E.LePore's and B.Loewer's solution, an alternative way of dealing with this problem is presented, making use of the notion of a canonically proved T-theorem.

Opublikowane
1993-03-01
Jak cytować
Cieśliński, C. (1993). Semantyka warunków prawdziwości i problem ekstensjonalności. Filozofia Nauki, 1(1), 103-111.