Trzeci rodzaj normatywności — wymóg reagowania na racje

  • Tomasz Żuradzki Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński
Słowa kluczowe: normativity, rationality, reasons, reason-responsiveness, Broome, Kolodny, Parfit

Abstrakt

In the article I demonstrate that the distinction between the genuine normativity and the normativity of the requirements of rationality is not exhaustive. It omits an important class of requirements, namely reason-responsiveness. On the one hand, this kind of requirements does not resemble the normative requirements in the genuine sense; on the other, there are important differences between rationality as coherence and the requirements of reason-responsiveness. I conclude that reason-responsiveness should be treated as a third kind of normative requirements.
Opublikowane
2014-12-01
Jak cytować
Żuradzki, T. (2014). Trzeci rodzaj normatywności — wymóg reagowania na racje. Filozofia Nauki, 22(4), 35-51.