The Bundle Theory of Particulars and Accidental Properties

  • Michał Nakoneczny Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski
Słowa kluczowe: the Bundle Theory of Particulars, trope theory, essentialism

Abstrakt

In this paper I evaluate four arguments formulated against the Bundle Theory of Particulars: the argument from tautologous subject-predicate discourse, the argument from essentialism, the argument from the impossibility of diachronic change, and the argument from the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. I propose a general strategy to deal with those and structurally similar problems and show how this strategy solves the four objections. The offered solution consists in analysing subject-predicate discourse in terms of coexemplification of properties rather than set-inclusion and in postulating that ordinary particulars are not bundles of properties but bundles of higher-order: either bundles of temporal parts (that are bundles of properties), which allows us to escape the problem of impossibility of change over time; or bundles of modal parts, which enables us to refute the argument from essentialism; or bundles of modal parts that are bundles of temporal parts that are bundles of tropes - which clears up both difficulties.
Opublikowane
2014-06-01
Jak cytować
Nakoneczny, M. (2014). The Bundle Theory of Particulars and Accidental Properties. Filozofia Nauki, 22(2), 125-135.