Samozwrotność i odrzucanie

  • Jan Woleński Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński


The paper consists of two parts. The first contains the paradox of Truth-teller, i.e. a sentence which asserts own truth. The paradox appears when we apply logic of rejection to the Truth-teller sentence. The Truth-teller paradox is symmetric with respect to the Liar paradox. The second part considers a sentence which asserts own provability. This sentence is unprovable on the base of rejection logic. This leads to counterparts of the Gödel incompleteness theorems and other metamathematical results.

Jak cytować
Woleński, J. (1993). Samozwrotność i odrzucanie. Filozofia Nauki, 1(1), 89-102.