Relewancja kauzalna a nominalizm. Kilka uwag na temat ontologii Davidsona
Słowa kluczowe:
epiphenomenalism, Davidson, events, properties, causal relation, objection, ontologyAbstrakt
The paper presents a rejoinder to Katarzyna Paprzycka's critique of my defence of Davidson's ontology. According to Paprzycka the epiphenomenalists objection to the doctrine of anomalous monism, considered as an internal objection, is unquestionably flawed, but when it comes to some external interpretations of the objection in question — it is justified. The text provides a couple of arguments and comments which are intended to show that in most cases the external objection to anomalous monism is in fact either uncharitable or inaccurate, thus unsound one.Pobrania
Opublikowane
2012-03-01
Jak cytować
Grygianiec, M. (2012). Relewancja kauzalna a nominalizm. Kilka uwag na temat ontologii Davidsona. Filozofia Nauki, 20(1), 109–115. Pobrano z https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/671
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