Kontrastywizm epistemiczny
Słowa kluczowe:
contrastivism, contextualism, knowledge ascriptions, the analysis of knowledgeAbstrakt
According to contrastivism in epistemology - advocated chiefly by Jonathan Schaffer - the knowledge relation is not binary (s knows that p) but ternary (s knows that p rather than q). Thus knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. The aim of this paper is to portray, investigate and assess the details of this view. In the first three sections I focus mainly on arguments for contrastivism. Section fourth is devoted to the contrastivist solution to the skeptical puzzle. In the last three sections I present several problems for contrastivism as well as three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity.Pobrania
Opublikowane
2009-12-01
Jak cytować
Palczewski, R. (2009). Kontrastywizm epistemiczny. Filozofia Nauki, 17(4), 105–130. Pobrano z https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/589
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