Kontrastywizm epistemiczny

Autor

  • Rafał Palczewski Katedra Logiki, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

Słowa kluczowe:

contrastivism, contextualism, knowledge ascriptions, the analysis of knowledge

Abstrakt

According to contrastivism in epistemology - advocated chiefly by Jonathan Schaffer - the knowledge relation is not binary (s knows that p) but ternary (s knows that p rather than q). Thus knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. The aim of this paper is to portray, investigate and assess the details of this view. In the first three sections I focus mainly on arguments for contrastivism. Section fourth is devoted to the contrastivist solution to the skeptical puzzle. In the last three sections I present several problems for contrastivism as well as three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity.

Pobrania

Opublikowane

2009-12-01

Jak cytować

Palczewski, R. (2009). Kontrastywizm epistemiczny. Filozofia Nauki, 17(4), 105–130. Pobrano z https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/589