Prawa natury, prawa nauki a cuda. Krytyka argumentów Hume'a przeciwko cudom

Autor

  • Andrzej Stępnik Katedra Nauk Społecznych, Akademia Wychowania Fizycznego w Warszawie

Abstrakt

In the article I consider Hume’s arguments against miracles and the notion of miracle. From Hume’s perspective, miracles are violations of the laws of nature caused by the supernatural being or beings. In Part I of On Miracles Hume argues that miracles can never be believed by a rational person. In Part II he attempts to demonstrate that there is actually no evidence for a miracle. Using distinction between laws of nature and scientific laws, and the deductive-nomological model of explanation, I come to some conclusions: 1. The Hume’s arguments against miracles are not conclusive. 2. The Mackie’s defense of Hume’s arguments is unsatisfactory. Moreover, Mackie himself gives the reasons which weaken his and Hume’s arguments against miracles. 3. There is consistent notion of miracle: miracle can be understood as a result of bursting supernatural factor into relatively isolated system of nature. 4. Miracles can occur without the violations of the laws of nature or the scientific law — the Hume’s notion of miracle is incorrect.

Pobrania

Opublikowane

2007-12-01

Jak cytować

Stępnik, A. (2007). Prawa natury, prawa nauki a cuda. Krytyka argumentów Hume’a przeciwko cudom. Filozofia Nauki, 15(4), 97–109. Pobrano z https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/526