Metafizyczne pułapki nauki popularnej na przykładzie ewolucjonizmu

Autor

  • Zbigniew Wróblewski Wydział Filozofii, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski

Abstrakt

The aim of this article is to give a philosophical analysis of inter-theoretical relations between the popular science and philosophy of nature and to formulate and the criteria of evaluation of correctness of such relations. The analysis is grounded in the domain of contemporary evolutionism. The main hypothesis is the following: The scientific theories do not imply philosophical theses directly. Nevertheless, they frequently appear in popular works as allegedly following scientific theories.. For example, papers on the theory of human evolution derive metaphysical theses from certain types of naturalism or spiritualism. These popular, metaphysically loaded, pseudo-scientific theories work as the traps. While using them, it is impossible to realize the cognitive aspirations of scientific theories (the error of metaphysical aspirations) that are suggested in their popular elaborations (the error of naive extrapolations). Metaphysical aspirations of the popular science result from the social demand for the philosophy of life. The main purpose of metaphysical interpretations is to turn the "scientific world" into the world of everyday life. This can be done in the frame of so-called hobby-philosophies, which are implicite loaded with serious metaphysical premises. Philosophy of nature is an open forum for the interpretations of scientific theories. Philosophy of nature takes into considerations theoretical as well as practical human attitudes towards the nature.

Pobrania

Opublikowane

2006-03-01

Jak cytować

Wróblewski, Z. (2006). Metafizyczne pułapki nauki popularnej na przykładzie ewolucjonizmu. Filozofia Nauki, 14(1), 119–127. Pobrano z https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/457