Wielowymiarowość umysłu

Abstrakt

In this paper I defend the multi-dimensional conception of the mind according to which an account of one-dimension, for example biological or computational or cultural, is insufficient for an adequate theory of the mind. The systematic account of this conception was presented in my book Philosophy of mind. The debate with naturalistic conceptions of mind (in Polish, Marszałek 2003). Here I only focus on some problems which have been raised by Robert Poczobut in his review of my book (presented in this volume). They are the following problems: the problem of unification of research in the paradigm of cognitive science (i.e., unification via information); the problem of reduction and emergence discussed on Searle's approach to the mind; the problem of causality and determinations of the mind (Does the mind have only causal, i.e. physical determination or not?, Does the determination of the mind have any influence on the causal complementation of the physical universe?, Is possible a system without any causal determination?); the problem of consciousness (Is consciousness possible in artificial intelligence? What is the conclusion from the known Searle's principle of connection saying about the connection between the intentional and conscious states?); and the problem of compatibility of descriptions given in the philosophy of mind at the psychological level, and in neuroscience at the neuronal level (I'd presented this compatibility on the analysis of the experience of pain). In the conclusion, entitled "Conclusion without dialectics," I reply to the objection of my reviewer that I admit the dialectics of naturalism with non-naturalism. I agree for such "dialectics" as a starting point from where I speak for certain continuity in research of the mind conducted by science and philosophy, but I also admit such dimensions of the mind which can be studied autonomically (in non-naturalistic philosophical approach).