Eksternalizm a problem lokalizacji umysłu

Abstrakt

There are philosophers of mind who believe that externalism with regard to mental content leads inevitably to the conclusion, that the mind should be identified with something external to the cognitive system. These philosophers are convinced that contents of our thoughts are not located in our heads on the basis of Putnam's belief that the contents of linguistic expressions are not located in head. The aim of this paper is to show that despite the above widespread convictions, externalism with regard to mental content allows to identify mental states with the states of the cognitive system. If the question regarding the localization of the mind makes any sense, the mind has to be identified with the entity located within the cognitive system of an individual. I will show that an externalist is not in a position to identify the mental with contents of representational states of the cognitive system. She is unable to identify the mind and mental states with physical bearers too. What is the common mistake of these two options is an unacceptable idealization according to which it is possible to separate content from a bearer. The only possible option that externalist could embrace is the one that says that a mental state should be identified with physical bearers bearing content. Such bearers are the physical objects that thanks to the system in which they exist can stand for other objects. Form the externalistic point of view this power of standing for something is determined, at least partially, by external factors.