Dlaczego za nośniki prawdy uważa się obiekty fizyczne?

Autor

  • Artur Rojszczak Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Abstrakt

The question stated in the title of the article splits into two other questions. One is historical: why did Alfred Tarski choose physical objects as truth-bearers in his famous article „On the notion of truth in languages of deductive sciences”? The second is philosophical: are there general reasons for choosing physical objects to play the role of truth-bearers? In the article the thesis put forward by H. Field and J. McDowell, that it is physicalism of Vienna Circle which had led Tarski to his choice, is rejected. Instead, it is argued that the source of Tarski's choice was Brentanian tradition.

Pobrania

Opublikowane

1998-03-01

Jak cytować

Rojszczak, A. (1998). Dlaczego za nośniki prawdy uważa się obiekty fizyczne?. Filozofia Nauki, 6(1), 65–79. Pobrano z https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/203