Niedostatki metod kwestionariuszowych w filozofii eksperymentalnej

Autor

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2022.0029

Słowa kluczowe:

experimental philosophy, questionnaire methodology, metaphilosophy

Abstrakt

Surveys are the most widely used research tool in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I analyze two types of criticism of the questionnaire method put forward in the literature. The first type is metaphilosophical. It asserts that the surveys used by experimental philosophers are based on a flawed and unproductive method of cases. The second type is methodological. It argues that currently used questionnaires are unfit to measure philosophically relevant phenomena. I show that these objections can be met by a) improving questionnaires used in research practice and b) expanding the methodological repertoire of experimental philosophy.

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Pobrania

Opublikowane

2022-10-31

Jak cytować

Maćkiewicz, B. (2022). Niedostatki metod kwestionariuszowych w filozofii eksperymentalnej. Filozofia Nauki, 30(3), 71–100. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2022.0029