Definition by Abstraction as a Method of the Empirical Sciences

Autor

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0021

Słowa kluczowe:

definition by abstraction, Peano, Dubislav, magnitudes, hyperintensional semantics

Abstrakt

In this paper, I analyze the structure of definition by abstraction employed in empirical sciences, whose specific feature is that it enables one to introduce a new magnitude on the basis of other, already known magnitudes. After reconstructing Aristotle’s and Archimedes’ treatment of the term “velocity,” I characterize in general terms the importance of this method for empirical sciences and address the nature of this definition drawing on Peano’s reconstruction. Next, I show that by means of that definition the magnitude mass can be introduced in classical mechanics, and the magnitude value in political economy drawing on the works of Ricardo. Then follows a critique of the nominalistic objections of Reichenbach and Dubislav against definition by abstraction. Finally, I show that this type of definition requires an in-depth semantic characterization, and this characterization should be based on the application of a hyperintensional semantic theory.

Bibliografia

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Opublikowane

2021-12-31

Jak cytować

Hanzel, I. (2021). Definition by Abstraction as a Method of the Empirical Sciences. Filozofia Nauki, 29(4), 31–56. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0021