Can Normative Economics Be Convincing without the Notion of Well-Being?

Słowa kluczowe: well-being, welfare, opportunity, capability, normative economics, positive economics


In this article, we examine the notion of well-being in light of the relationship between positive and normative economics. Having identified four interrelationships between possible theoretical developments within the two fields, we propose a framework for the analysis of normative economic theories. The starting point for these considerations were competing stances on well-being proposed by neoclassical welfare economics, Robert Sugden, Amartya Sen, and Daniel Hausman.


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Jak cytować
Kwarciński, T., & Turek, K. (2022). Can Normative Economics Be Convincing without the Notion of Well-Being?. Filozofia Nauki, 29(3), 37-61.