First-Person Authority Through the Lens of Experimental Philosophy

  • Joanna Komorowska-Mach Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw
  • Andrzej Szczepura Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw
Słowa kluczowe: first-person authority, self-ascriptions, mental states ascription, privileged access, disagreement


In this paper, we analyze the problem of first-person authority and the possibility of disagreement over mental states between first- and third-person ascribers. We explain why discussion on this matter should be preceded by empirical study on the actual strength, scope, and restrictions to such authority. We present a new study in which we show that the type of the ascribed mental state and the kind of interpersonal relationship between speakers both influence the strength of first-person authority. We also suggest that analysis of a disagreement between a first- and a third-person ascriber of a mental state should take into account the intuition that it is possible that neither of these disagreeing speakers is wrong in their ascriptions.


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Jak cytować
Komorowska-Mach, J., & Szczepura, A. (2021). First-Person Authority Through the Lens of Experimental Philosophy. Filozofia Nauki, 29(2), 209-227.