The Method of Cases: A Case Study

Słowa kluczowe: method of cases, Gettier cases, Fake Barn, Edouard Machery, methodology, metaphilosophy, theory of knowledge

Abstrakt

The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative interpretation of the method of cases, analyze two of its particular implementations in the theory of knowledge, and argue that the method of cases, according to this interpretation, is not prone to challenges posed by its recent critics, such as Edouard Machery (2017). The core of the proposed interpretation is that the method of cases consists of two steps (the case description and the target argument) and that the case description does not elicit judgments about the applicability of the concepts in question. In fact, case descriptions do not elicit anything at all; rather, they show some facts, usually some factual distinctions among relevant situations. Specifically, the Gettier cases and the Fake Barn cases show a certain differentiation in the ways of holding beliefs. How to adjust the concept of knowledge to such differentiation — if at all — belongs to the argumentative step.

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Opublikowane
2021-12-21
Jak cytować
Tałasiewicz, M. (2021). The Method of Cases: A Case Study. Filozofia Nauki, 29(2), 115-131. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0010