Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable across Both Demographic Groups and Situations

Słowa kluczowe: experimental philosophy, cross-cultural, intuitions


In the early years of experimental philosophy, a number of studies seemed to suggest that people’s philosophical intuitions were unstable. Some studies seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across demographic groups; others seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across situations. Now, approximately two decades into the development of experimental philosophy, we have much more data concerning these questions. The data available now appear to suggest that philosophical intuitions are actually quite stable. In particular, they suggest that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across both demographic groups and situations.


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Jak cytować
Knobe, J. (2021). Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable across Both Demographic Groups and Situations. Filozofia Nauki, 29(2), 11-76.