Jaka teoria działania? O "Mechanice działań" Michała Barcza

Słowa kluczowe: philosophy of action, causal theory of action, intention, rationality, artificial intelligence

Abstrakt

This is a review of Michał Barcz’s book Mechanika działań. Filozoficzny spór wokół przyczynowej teorii działania (Mechanics of Actions: Philosophical Dispute over the Causal Theory of Action). The book discusses various causal accounts of intentional action and presents several arguments against them. The review focuses on accuracy in presentation of different causal theories of action and soundness of arguments presented against them by the author. At the end, I discuss some methodological issues raised by the book.

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Opublikowane
2020-12-31
Jak cytować
Tarnowski, M. (2020). Jaka teoria działania? O "Mechanice działań" Michała Barcza. Filozofia Nauki, 28(4), 83-102. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0023