Pan Cogito wypełnia kwestionariusz. Filozofia eksperymentalna wobec pytania o naturę kompetencji filozoficznej

Słowa kluczowe: filozofia eksperymentalna, kompetencja filozoficzna, metafilozofia

Abstrakt

The project of experimental philosophy rests on the assumption that comparing the philosophical views held by professional philosophers with the views of non-philosophers is logically correct and philosophically plausible. There are at least three components of this assumption. First, experimental philosophers are committed to the institutional account of philosophical competence: a person counts as a philosopher if they have graduated in philosophy or at least attended philosophy lectures. Second, experimental philosophers assume that some words from everyday vocabulary automatically refer to certain philosophical problems. Third, experimental philosophy fails to distinguish between de re and de dicto philosophical beliefs. I propose harking back to an approach to philosophical competence that portrays it as a kind of self-knowledge (the recognition of one’s epistemic position, similar to what Husserl referred to as bracketing of the natural attitude). In this light, I offer some new prospects for experimental philosophy.

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Opublikowane
2019-06-30
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Jak cytować
Werner, K. (2019). Pan Cogito wypełnia kwestionariusz. Filozofia eksperymentalna wobec pytania o naturę kompetencji filozoficznej. Filozofia Nauki, 27(2), 87-114. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0012