Kompatybilistyczna odpowiedź na problem wykluczenia przyczynowego

  • Jan Rostek Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Jagielloński
Słowa kluczowe: non-reductive physicalism, compatibilism,, causal exclusion, counterfactuals, overdetermination

Abstrakt

The causal exclusion problem, as presented by Jaegwon Kim, is aimed to show that non-reductive physicalism is self-contradictory, as it is impossible for effects already having a sufficient physical cause to have a distinct mental cause. One possible reply to Kim’s argument is compatibilism — a view within non-reductive physicalism that states that psychophysical supervenience is able to sustain the coexistence of efficacious mental and physical causes. The aim of this paper is to describe the currently most popular compatibilist strategy, as well as to present and evaluate some objections to it. First, I sketch the causal exclusion problem and show how compatibilists could undermine the causal exclusion principle using counterfactual analysis. Then I point out why this is a troublesome and insufficient tool and what challenges await compatibilism in its current form.

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Opublikowane
2019-03-31
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Jak cytować
Rostek, J. (2019). Kompatybilistyczna odpowiedź na problem wykluczenia przyczynowego. Filozofia Nauki, 27(1), 73-93. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0004