Introspection — One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge

Słowa kluczowe: self-knowledge, introspection, pluralism, mental states, philosophy of mind


The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphilosophical analysis of the debate between monistic and pluralistic approaches to self-knowledge. I start by presenting the background for the discussion, clarifying the terminology, and drawing a distinction between moderate and radical pluralism. I then discuss and evaluate arguments for monism that appeal to general methodological guidelines as well as those relying on specific assumptions about the objects and character of self-knowledge. I offer a separate analysis of Eric Schwitzgebel’s radical pluralism, which threatens to undermine both monism and moderate pluralism. I close by describing a way of looking at the problem of the homogeneity of self-knowledge that goes beyond the monism–pluralism dichotomy and arguing that the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of the problem of self-knowledge are more important than the plurality of the solutions.


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Komorowska-Mach, J. (2019). Introspection — One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge. Filozofia Nauki, 27(1), 5-25.