Are We Rational When It Comes to Rationality? [Review of Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics, M. Hetmański (ed.), Leiden: Brill–Rodopi 2018]

  • Jakub Rudnicki Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski
Słowa kluczowe: rationality, decision making, Gerd Gigerenzer, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, bias, group agent, heuristics


The paper is a review of the book Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics edited by Marek Hetmański. The volume consists of eighteen chapters on different topics revolving around the common theme of rationality. The review discusses each paper, focusing more closely on some, in order to evaluate the arguments and claims that I find interesting, controversial, or surprising. Most chapters fall into the category of standard analytic philosophy with just a few lightly flirting with other philosophical traditions and one discussing José Ortega y Gasset.


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Jak cytować
Rudnicki, J. (2018). Are We Rational When It Comes to Rationality? [Review of Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics, M. Hetmański (ed.), Leiden: Brill–Rodopi 2018]. Filozofia Nauki, 26(4), 131-145.