Nazwy i przedmioty w Traktacie logiczno-filozoficznym

  • Krystian Bogucki Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski
Słowa kluczowe: nazwa, przedmiot, możliwości prawdziwościowe, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Abstrakt

In this paper, I try to answer the following questions: what are objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? What function does a name perform in a sentence according to Wittgenstein? What is the Bedeutung of a name? I argue that answers to these questions come from the Wittgensteinian vision of logic. The first part of the article concerns Frege and Russell’s universalist conception of logic, which is the main object of Wittgenstein’s attack. The second part of the
article is about Wittgenstein’s conception of logic and some consequences of this conception for the interpretation of Tractatarian objects and names. My main result is that the meaning of a name should be understood as a truth-value potential of an expression. The last part concerns the connections between the so-called ontological parts of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s views on an ideal formal language.

Opublikowane
2018-12-31
© University of Warsaw. All rights reserved.
Jak cytować
Bogucki, K. (2018). Nazwy i przedmioty w Traktacie logiczno-filozoficznym. Filozofia Nauki, 26(4), 111-129.