Epistemiczny efekt Knobe’a a problem Butlera. Test hipotezy zaniechaniowej

  • Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman Zakład Epistemologii, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski
Słowa kluczowe: pistemic side-effect effect, intentional action, intentional omission, Knobe effect, Butler problem, knowledge


The omissions account offers structurally close explanations of the Knobe effect, the Butler problem, and the epistemic side-effect effect. Moreover, it predicts that the epistemic side-effect effect should be present not only in Knobe-type stories but also in Butler-type stories. Since the probability that the effect takes place is not greater than 1/6, the attribution of knowledge that it will take place is prima facie irrational. However, according to the omissions account, in the immoral situations, the knowledge claim can be read as a consequence-knowledge claim, which can be rationally accepted. I report the results of two studies, based on Nadelhoffer’s study of the Butler problem, where ascriptions of knowledge in Butler-type scenarios are investigated.


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Jak cytować
Paprzycka-Hausman, K. (2018). Epistemiczny efekt Knobe’a a problem Butlera. Test hipotezy zaniechaniowej. Filozofia Nauki, 26(3), 49-77. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0017