Filozofia Nauki https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn <p>„Filozofia Nauki” (ang. "The Philosophy of Science") jest kwartalnikiem naukowym wydawanym w Instytucie Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Zamieszcza recenzowane artykuły, polemiki i recenzje obejmujące cały zakres filozofii analitycznej, w tym epistemologię, ontologię, filozofię nauki, filozofię języka, filozofię umysłu, logikę filozoficzną, semiotykę logiczną, prakseologię i kognitywistykę.</p> pl-PL filnauki.wfis@uw.edu.pl (Marta Zaręba) filnauki.wfis@uw.edu.pl (Bartosz Maćkiewicz) Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 OJS 3.1.0.1 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim as a Logical Consequence of Semiotic Idealism https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/937 <p>The purpose of this paper is to show that the pragmatic maxim can be construed as a logical consequence of semiotic idealism. Peirce proposed his semiotic idealism in the 1860s and based it on two premises: first, that we could know only symbols and, second, that the only things that exist are those that could be known. From these premises, he concluded that only symbols exist. This conception was meant to refute the distinction between the substance and its phenomenal manifestations. If semiotic idealism implies the pragmatic maxim, then it becomes clear why the pragmatic maxim says that the conception of the effects of the object is the conception of the object: it is because Peirce thought that the effects are the object. Furthermore, the close link between these conceptions may account for Peirce’s prolonged silence about pragmatism.</p> Segiusz Tokariew ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/937 Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 Regresy podobieństwa. Podwójny relacyjny argument przeciwko nominalizmowi tropowemu https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/938 <p>Trope nominalists claim that resemblance is a primitive relation. There are two well-known arguments that aim to prove that such resemblance leads to a vicious regress. On the one hand, Bertrand Russell famously argued that resemblance relations imply an infinite series of resemblances holding between them. On the other hand, less famously, Edmund Husserl claimed that resemblance must be grounded in identity, for otherwise it falls into a vicious regress. In this paper, I argue that these arguments are intimately connected and, in fact, form a single complex case against nominalism. The point is that the standard solution to the Russell regress, which takes resemblance to be an internal relation, leads to the Husserl regress, and vice versa: a solution to the Husserl regress is possible when resemblance is taken to be an external relation, which immediately leads to the Russell regress.</p> Paweł Rojek ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/938 Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 Problem Butlera z perspektywy racjonalnego sprawcy https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/939 <p>Butler’s problem poses a challenge to philosophical theories of intentional action because it suggests that intentionality attribution is dependent on moral judgement. Experimental results reached so far seem to confirm this thesis. However, the agent described in Butler scenarios seems to lack fundamental rationality, which may distort intuitions about the intentionality of his/her actions. An experimental study described in this work aims to overcome this problem by providing explicit reasons for action. Strength of motivation is also compared with moral judgement as a factor in intentionality attribution. The results of the study suggest that neither explicitly described reasons nor strength of motivation have a significant influence on intentionality attribution in Butler scenarios.</p> Adam Wierzbicki ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/939 Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 O doksastycznej naturze wiedzy https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/940 <p>The paper is devoted to the doxastic nature of knowledge, represented in the traditional epistemology by the belief condition (part of the so-called JTB definition of knowledge) that one can only know what one believes. The article is divided into four parts, in which various arguments against the doxastic nature of knowledge are discussed and rejected. The first part starts with general linguistic and pragmatic reflections on the relation between knowledge and belief, and ends with a discussion of some problematic epistemic-doxastic conjunctions and implications. The second part deals with linguistic problems related to the difference between epistemic and doxastic attributions, e.g., in erotetic and evaluation contexts. The third part is concerned with the accuracy of thought experiments, i.e., descriptions of possible situations in which a person knows but does not believe. The fourth part focuses mainly on doxastic ambiguity (e.g., dispositional vs.occurrent belief, thin vs. thick belief), context sensitivity, and vagueness, including the notions of half-belief and in-between belief. The conclusion is that the belief condition is well-founded, but it should take a more precise form: one can know what one dispositionally and thinly believes.</p> Rafał Palczewski ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/940 Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 Struktury uzasadniania. Część II. Fundacjonizm https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/943 <p>This paper is the second part of a series of articles concerning the structure of justification. The author discusses foundationalism — the most often adopted position on this issue. He distinguishes different kinds of this position and points out the main objections against it. General considerations concerning foundationalism are illustrated by solutions included in the theories of “the late” Laurence BonJour and Robert Audi.</p> Jacek Ziobrowski ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/943 Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 Przyczynki do teorii definicji https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/941 <p>Being the results of conceptual analysis, definitions play a crucial role in philosophy. On the one hand, providing a good definition is often counted as a significant philosophical result. On the other, the lack of a correct definition is sometimes the main reason for futile philosophical controversies. That is why the theory of definitions is among the central aims of the methodology of philosophy. The paper proposes some improvements of the traditional semiotic conception of definitions, especially as it is applied in philosophy. Classifications of definitions are analyzed and new kinds of definitions are distinguished (with respect to structure, genesis, type of sense indicated, etc.). The paper also describes various ways of establishing definitions and reconstructs the criteria of correctness that apply to definitions.</p> Anna Brożek ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/941 Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000 Quo vadis, realisme? O obecnym stanie sporu o realizm naukowy https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/942 <p>The article investigates the intuition that both scientific realism and scientific antirealism are turning into degenerating research programs. The evolution of realism in reaction to pessimistic (meta)induction has certainly led to its increased sophistication as it has given rise to various versions of selective realism. However, many current discussions seem either too focused on semantic niceties or are turning into endless quarrels over case-study refutations of particular forms of realism. The point of finding a better understanding of the relations of scientific knowledge to the world seems to get lost in the process. Magnus, Callender, and Saatsi are among those who see the problem. Although drawing on different observations, they agree that the source of the problem is the wholesale approach according to which it is possible to resolve the realism debate in one move, by finding a single universal method of interpreting any scientific theory. Instead, they call for a more modest approach, based on case-by-case analyses. Particularly promising is Saatsi’s idea of exemplar realism, according to which realism should be an attitude motivating detailed case studies rather than a specific account of science in general.</p> Mateusz Kotowski ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/942 Sat, 30 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0000