Filozofia Nauki <p>„Filozofia Nauki” (ang. "The Philosophy of Science") jest kwartalnikiem naukowym wydawanym w Instytucie Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Zamieszcza recenzowane artykuły, polemiki i recenzje obejmujące cały zakres filozofii analitycznej, w tym epistemologię, ontologię, filozofię nauki, filozofię języka, filozofię umysłu, logikę filozoficzną, semiotykę logiczną, prakseologię i kognitywistykę.</p> pl-PL (Marta Zaręba) (Bartosz Maćkiewicz) Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 OJS 60 Introspection — One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge <p>The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphilosophical analysis of the debate between monistic&nbsp;and pluralistic approaches to self-knowledge. I start by presenting the background for the discussion,&nbsp;clarifying the terminology, and drawing a distinction between moderate and radical pluralism.&nbsp;I then discuss and evaluate arguments for monism that appeal to general methodological guidelines as well as those relying on specific assumptions about the objects and character of self-knowledge. I offer a separate analysis of Eric Schwitzgebel’s radical pluralism, which threatens to&nbsp;undermine both monism and moderate pluralism. I close by describing a way of looking at the&nbsp;problem of the homogeneity of self-knowledge that goes beyond the monism–pluralism dichotomy&nbsp;and arguing that the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of the problem of self-knowledge are&nbsp;more important than the plurality of the solutions.</p> Joanna Komorowska-Mach ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 Problem wszechwiedzy logicznej. Krytyka światów nienormalnych i propozycja nowego rozwiązania <p>In this paper, we bring up the problem of logical omniscience in epistemic logic. One way of&nbsp;avoiding the problem is through Rantala models, where non-normal worlds are introduced. Such&nbsp;models are vulnerable to criticism, as we show. One of many issues that occur is the Bjerring result, which states that incorporating non-normal worlds makes the agent logically incompetent.&nbsp;For this reason, we propose a different solution based on positional logics.</p> Mateusz Klonowski, Krzysztof Krawczyk ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 Inwariantyzm a transcendentyzm <p>In a number of works, Peter Simons proposed an interesting theory of persistence in time, which&nbsp;he sometimes describes as invariantism. Unfortunately, in the last two decades, despite its unquestionable merits, invariantism has attracted little interest among thinkers engaged in the debate over persistence. The debate continues to revolve around well-known solutions, i.e., endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. It seems to ignore the efforts of the few thinkers who&nbsp;try to break the theoretical deadlock that has for many years dominated the discussion. The purpose of this article is, first, to reconstruct and critically analyze Simons’ invariantist theory, and&nbsp;second, to compare it with another theoretical proposal, namely transcendentism, recently advanced by Damiano Costa and Alessandro Giordani. By means of a simple comparative analysis,&nbsp;I shall try to show that these views are convergent: they differ only in a few elements that are either&nbsp;negligible or could be accepted within both theories. This result should not, however, be interpreted as an attempt to formulate a hybrid position. On the one hand, transcendentism can be&nbsp;treated, to some extent, as a fairly natural foundation of invariantism, whereas invariantism can<br>be regarded as a technical development of transcendentism (providing it with a suitable remedy&nbsp;for some interpretative difficulties). On the other hand, invariantism and transcendentism interpret temporal location of objects completely differently, and so, at the end of the day, their paths&nbsp;must diverge. The indirect aim of the paper is to show that both invariantism and transcendentism&nbsp;should no longer be ignored in the debate on the nature of persistence.</p> Mariusz Grygianiec ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 Kompatybilistyczna odpowiedź na problem wykluczenia przyczynowego <p>The causal exclusion problem, as presented by Jaegwon Kim, is aimed to show that non-reductive&nbsp;physicalism is self-contradictory, as it is impossible for effects already having a sufficient physical&nbsp;cause to have a distinct mental cause. One possible reply to Kim’s argument is compatibilism —&nbsp;a view within non-reductive physicalism that states that psychophysical supervenience is able to&nbsp;sustain the coexistence of efficacious mental and physical causes. The aim of this paper is to describe&nbsp;the currently most popular compatibilist strategy, as well as to present and evaluate some objections to it. First, I sketch the causal exclusion problem and show how compatibilists could undermine the causal exclusion principle using counterfactual analysis. Then I point out why this is&nbsp;a troublesome and insufficient tool and what challenges await compatibilism in its current form.</p> Jan Rostek ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 Prawo czy forma? Francisa Bacona koncepcja prawidłowości w przyrodzie <p>The aim of this paper is to analyze the terms “law” (of nature) and “form” in two works of Francis&nbsp;Bacon: the Novum Organum and The Advancement of Learning. The term “form” belongs to the&nbsp;scholastic tradition, whereas the term “law” is crucial for modern scientific methodology. The&nbsp;analysis starts with general characteristics of both terms and then traces them in Bacon’s writings. Both terms turn out to be important for Bacon, but it is argued that to fully understand his&nbsp;approach, his nominalistic tendencies should be acknowledged as well.</p> Joanna Luc ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 Nauka i technika w dobie globalizacji <p>This article discusses various accounts of science and technology as well as their interrelations.&nbsp;The traditional approach to science and technology in the classical philosophy of science is&nbsp;contrasted with a relatively new approach rooted in reconstructions of laboratory practices.&nbsp;Subsequently, both approaches are considered in the context of globalization. The analysis of&nbsp;globalization licenses the claim that any reliable science and technology studies must allow for&nbsp;Stefan Amsterdamski’s concept of the ideal of scientific knowledge.</p> Marek Sikora ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 Enlightenment and Realism <p>Steven Pinker’s book Enlightenment Now is a landmark achievement, if it is considered only as a&nbsp;review of the history of social progress in the world since the mid-eighteenth century. Pinker&nbsp;demonstrates, beyond reasonable doubt, that great progress has been made on almost every&nbsp;front. But, it is argued, much of this progress has been bought at the cost of social progress in&nbsp;First World countries. For it has been achieved by reverse engineering the social structures to&nbsp;make them resemble more closely the neoclassical model of a nation’s economy — a model that&nbsp;contains neither a government nor any socially-funded social services. The reviewer argues that&nbsp;the practice of changing the social facts, in order to make them fit a given theoretical model better, is contrary to scientific method, and that we need a new enlightenment now to develop scientifically more realistic theories in the social sciences.</p> Brian Ellis ##submission.copyrightStatement## Sun, 31 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000