Filozofia Nauki <p>„Filozofia Nauki” (ang. "The Philosophy of Science") jest kwartalnikiem naukowym wydawanym przez Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Zamieszcza recenzowane artykuły, polemiki i recenzje obejmujące cały zakres filozofii analitycznej, w tym epistemologię, ontologię, filozofię nauki, filozofię języka, filozofię umysłu, logikę filozoficzną, semiotykę logiczną, prakseologię i kognitywistykę.</p> Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland pl-PL Filozofia Nauki 1230-6894 The Adolescence of Experimental Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue of Filozofia Nauki Adrian Ziółkowski ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-01-10 2022-01-10 29 2 5 9 10.14394/filnau.2021.0015 Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable across Both Demographic Groups and Situations <p>In the early years of experimental philosophy, a number of studies seemed to suggest that people’s philosophical intuitions were unstable. Some studies seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across demographic groups; others seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across situations. Now, approximately two decades into the development of experimental philosophy, we have much more data concerning these questions. The data available now appear to suggest that philosophical intuitions are actually quite stable. In particular, they suggest that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across both demographic groups and situations.</p> Joshua Knobe ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-11-27 2021-11-27 29 2 11 76 10.14394/filnau.2021.0007 The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work <p>The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the furthest edges of possible applications of x-phi in metaphysics and formal philosophy. Ultimately, the fourfold route helps us understand a different kind of empirical fact: the development of x-phi itself.</p> Robert Barnard Joseph Ulatowski Jonathan M. Weinberg ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-01-10 2022-01-10 29 2 77 113 10.14394/filnau.2021.0012 The Method of Cases: A Case Study <p>The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative interpretation of the method of cases, analyze two of its particular implementations in the theory of knowledge, and argue that the method of cases, according to this interpretation, is not prone to challenges posed by its recent critics, such as Edouard Machery (2017). The core of the proposed interpretation is that the method of cases consists of two steps (the case description and the target argument) and that the case description does not elicit judgments about the applicability of the concepts in question. In fact, case descriptions do not elicit anything at all; rather, they show some facts, usually some factual distinctions among relevant situations. Specifically, the Gettier cases and the Fake Barn cases show a certain differentiation in the ways of holding beliefs. How to adjust the concept of knowledge to such differentiation — if at all — belongs to the argumentative step.</p> Mieszko Tałasiewicz ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-12-21 2021-12-21 29 2 115 131 10.14394/filnau.2021.0010 An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements <p>According to Cappelen (2012), analytic philosophers have traditionally used two arguments to defend the role of intuitions in philosophy. On the one hand, <em>The</em> <em>Argument from Philosophical Practice</em> claims that analytic philosophers rely on intuitions when defending their theories. On the other hand, <em>The Argument from</em> <em>Intuition Talk</em> contends that intuitions must play a prominent role in analytic philosophy because analytic philosophers use intuition talk profusely. Cappelen (2012) identifies three questions to be considered when assessing the Argument from Intuition Talk: a quantitative question, a centrality question, and an interpretative question. The available studies have mainly focused on the quantitative and interpretative questions. In this paper, I examine the centrality question, taking as a case study the literature on taste disagreements — a topic that has received significant attention in the philosophy of language in the last fifteen years. To this end, I first build a corpus with the most relevant works in the area and then examine the centrality of intuition talk. The results show that the use of intuition talk is central in the literature on taste disagreements, and that intuitions are taken as evidence in favor of a given theory if the theory can account for them.</p> David Bordonaba-Plou ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-12-03 2021-12-03 29 2 133 156 10.14394/filnau.2021.0008 The Context-Sensitivity of Color Adjectives and Folk Intuitions <p>In this paper, I report new empirical data on folk semantic intuitions concerning color adjectives in so-called context-shifting experiments. Contextualists present such experiments — that is, they describe different conversational contexts in which a given sentence is uttered — in order to argue that context can shape meaning and truth conditions to such a degree that competent speakers would give opposite truth evaluations of the same sentence in different contexts. The initial findings of Hansen and Chemla (2013) suggest that laypersons’ semantic judgments are sensitive to context in the same way that is predicted by contextualists. In this paper, I focus on context-shifting experiments that involve color adjectives; also, I present experiments that are a partial replication and methodological extension of Hansen and Chemla’s study. One aim of my study was to corroborate these authors’ findings using a bigger sample (total N = 1128), but the main goal was to test the stability of results in different methodological variants of empirical adaptations of context-shifting experiments. This part of the study addresses the issues pointed out in my earlier paper (Ziółkowski 2017), where I argued that certain experimental settings (within-subjects) might bring data that is more favorable to contextualism than other settings (between-subjects). My study compares three different experimental settings: within-subjects (with randomized order of context presentation), between-subjects (where participants evaluating different contexts are<br>distinct groups), and “contrastive design” (where both contexts are presented side by side on the same screen). My results are highly consistent across the methodological variants I employed, but while they show some of the effects expected by contextualists, it is disputable whether they bring strong support to contextualism with respect to color adjectives.</p> Adrian Ziółkowski ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-01-10 2022-01-10 29 2 157 188 10.14394/filnau.2021.0013 Lying by Omission: Experimental Studies <p>Leading theories of lying disagree on many points, but they agree on the following assumption: lying essentially involves asserting. The possibility of lying by omission poses a challenge to that shared assumption. To lie by omission is to lie by not asserting. This paper is the first experimental investigation of whether lying by omission is conceptually possible, according to our ordinary, shared lying concept. Overall, our results support, without proving, that it is not possible. Based on the present findings, we hypothesize that to the extent that people are tempted to call an omission a “lie,” it is for lack of a better word. When provided more flexibility to express themselves, almost no one in our studies counted an omission as a lie.</p> Ezri Chernak Kurt Dietrich Ashley Raspopovic Sarah Turri John Turri ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2022-01-10 2022-01-10 29 2 189 208 10.14394/filnau.2021.0014 First-Person Authority Through the Lens of Experimental Philosophy <p>In this paper, we analyze the problem of first-person authority and the possibility of disagreement over mental states between first- and third-person ascribers. We explain why discussion on this matter should be preceded by empirical study on the actual strength, scope, and restrictions to such authority. We present a new study in which we show that the type of the ascribed mental state and the kind of interpersonal relationship between speakers both influence the strength of first-person authority. We also suggest that analysis of a disagreement between a first- and a third-person ascriber of a mental state should take into account the intuition that it is possible that neither of these disagreeing speakers is wrong in their ascriptions.</p> Joanna Komorowska-Mach Andrzej Szczepura ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2021-12-21 2021-12-21 29 2 209 227 10.14394/filnau.2021.0011