Filozofia Nauki <p>„Filozofia Nauki” (ang. "The Philosophy of Science") jest kwartalnikiem naukowym wydawanym w Instytucie Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Zamieszcza recenzowane artykuły, polemiki i recenzje obejmujące cały zakres filozofii analitycznej, w tym epistemologię, ontologię, filozofię nauki, filozofię języka, filozofię umysłu, logikę filozoficzną, semiotykę logiczną, prakseologię i kognitywistykę.</p> Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland pl-PL Filozofia Nauki 1230-6894 Yablo’s Paradoxes in Non-arithmetical Setting <p>Proving a paradox from very weak assumptions helps us to reveal what the source of the paradox is.&nbsp;We introduce a weak non-arithmetical theory in a language of predicate logic and give proofs for&nbsp;various versions of Yablo’s paradox in this weak system. We prove Always, Sometimes, Almost ,Always, and Infinitely Often versions of Yablo’s paradox in the presented weak axiom system,&nbsp;which is much weaker than the arithmetical setting.</p> Ahmad Karimi ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-06-30 2019-06-30 27 2 5 15 10.14394/filnau.2019.0008 The Methods of Construction in Schrödinger’s "Mitteilungen" <p>The paper reconstructs the methods used by Schrödinger in the construction of wave mechanics&nbsp;as given in his four <em>Mitteilungen</em>. These methods are described from the point of view of modern&nbsp;philosophy of science, with a focus on the relationships between scientific theories and on the&nbsp;reconstruction of the structure of scientific laws and the relations between scientific laws. After&nbsp;reconstructing the derivation of the first equation in<em> Mitteilung 1</em>, it analyzes the methodology of&nbsp;the optical-mechanical analogy in <em>Mitteilung 2</em> and reconstructs the two heuristic pathways that&nbsp;led to the construction of wave equations as the basis of wave mechanics in the first two <em>Mitteilungen</em>. Finally, it addresses the methods of generalization, application, and explanation by which&nbsp;the second, third, and fourth<em> Mitteilungen</em> are constructed.</p> Igor Hanzel ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-06-30 2019-06-30 27 2 17 37 10.14394/filnau.2019.0009 Weryfikacjonizm Wittgensteina <p>The paper explores Wittgenstein’s discourse of 1929-1930 concerning the problem of verification&nbsp;in respect of both its textual sources and its significance. I first discuss the most important interpretations of the issue and then analyze Wittgenstein’s notes from that period along with his conversations with Schlick and Waismann. The results of the analysis imply that the empirical sense&nbsp;of verification intertwines with its grammatical sense. On the one hand, the question of verification appears in the context of phenomenology and so-called phenomenological language, referring to immediate experience; on the other hand, it is conceived of as a means of settling the&nbsp;sense of a sentence, or, which amounts to the same thing, of fixing the available uses of a sentence. Such an ambiguity is characteristic of the middle, transitory period of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development.</p> Piotr Dehnel ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-06-30 2019-06-30 27 2 39 57 10.14394/filnau.2019.0010 Jednoznaczna charakterystyka, subiektywność oraz stopniowalność świadomości. Zarys rozwiązań trzech problemów <p>Contemporary consciousness studies are a field that presents us with a multiplicity of more or&nbsp;less fundamental empirical and theoretical problems. Of these, the most basic concerns the lack&nbsp;of an unambiguous characterization of consciousness itself. There is no universal description of&nbsp;the phenomenon in question, or at least no widely accepted definition, while most working applications of the concept in articles, research projects or empirical trials vary significantly. A closely&nbsp;linked question concerns the relationship between consciousness and subjectivity: are the conscious states of an organism or system coextensive with its subjective states? Such an assumption,&nbsp;though by no means self-evidently valid, seems to be operative in many influential conceptions&nbsp;and theories of consciousness today. Yet another important issue within the current debate concerns the question of whether consciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon. This&nbsp;problem is particularly interesting because some researchers insist that it is very difficult to justify ascribing such gradedness to consciousness given its manifold dimensions. The aim of this&nbsp;article is to present and justify these solutions in a condensed form, while at the same time&nbsp;pointing out their consequences and related issues worthy of further study.</p> Jakub Jonkisz ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-06-30 2019-06-30 27 2 59 85 10.14394/filnau.2019.0011 Pan Cogito wypełnia kwestionariusz. Filozofia eksperymentalna wobec pytania o naturę kompetencji filozoficznej <p>The project of experimental philosophy rests on the assumption that comparing the philosophical&nbsp;views held by professional philosophers with the views of non-philosophers is logically correct&nbsp;and philosophically plausible. There are at least three components of this assumption. First, experimental philosophers are committed to the institutional account of philosophical competence:&nbsp;a person counts as a philosopher if they have graduated in philosophy or at least attended philosophy lectures. Second, experimental philosophers assume that some words from everyday&nbsp;vocabulary automatically refer to certain philosophical problems. Third, experimental philosophy&nbsp;fails to distinguish between de re and de dicto philosophical beliefs. I propose harking back to an&nbsp;approach to philosophical competence that portrays it as a kind of self-knowledge (the recognition of one’s epistemic position, similar to what Husserl referred to as bracketing of the natural attitude). In this light, I offer some new prospects for experimental philosophy.</p> Konrad Werner ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-06-30 2019-06-30 27 2 87 114 10.14394/filnau.2019.0012 Problemy koncepcyjne naturalizmu redukcyjnego Quine’a <p>Quine’s position is counted as a reductive naturalism. It overcomes both the traditional Cartesian-Kantian approach to philosophy and the theory of logical empiricism. In consequence, Quine&nbsp;turns for guidance to empirical science. Philosophical reflection turns out to be secondary and&nbsp;dependent on science, for it is the empirical sciences that are the only source of genuine knowledge.&nbsp;As a result, philosophy should be reduced, in Quine’s view, to the application of scientific methods to&nbsp;problems that more general than those raised within the sciences themselves. Quine’s position is&nbsp;criticized in this article both internally, for being inconsistent, and externally, from the point of&nbsp;view of non-reductive naturalism. The criticism primarily pertains to (a) the doctrine of physicalism,&nbsp;(b) the thought-experiment regarding the indeterminacy of translation, and (c) non-observability&nbsp;of the principles of naturalism.</p> Michał Haraburda ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-06-30 2019-06-30 27 2 115 140 Reprezentacja muzyczna a filozofia umysłu <p>Representation is one of the key concepts in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. The philosophical problem of musical meaning, or rather its naturalistic reformulation, has only recently&nbsp;become the topic of empirical investigation. It might seem obvious that an explication of the concept&nbsp;of meaning would appeal to the concept of representation. It is not a popular approach in the&nbsp;philosophy of the cognitive science of music, however. The aim of this paper is to provide an&nbsp;overview of possible frames of analysis of musical representation within selected contemporary&nbsp;paradigms in the broadly understood philosophy of mind and cognitive science.</p> Tomasz Szubart ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-06-30 2019-06-30 27 2 141 151 10.14394/filnau.2019.0014