https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/issue/feed Filozofia Nauki 2022-07-29T17:29:23+00:00 Krzysztof Sękowski filnauki.wfis@uw.edu.pl Open Journal Systems <p>„Filozofia Nauki” (ang. "The Philosophy of Science") jest kwartalnikiem naukowym wydawanym przez Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Zamieszcza recenzowane artykuły, polemiki i recenzje obejmujące cały zakres filozofii analitycznej, w tym epistemologię, ontologię, filozofię nauki, filozofię języka, filozofię umysłu, logikę filozoficzną, semiotykę logiczną, prakseologię i kognitywistykę.</p> https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1247 In Defense of Conditional Uniqueness 2022-07-29T17:26:56+00:00 Erhan Demircioğlu erdemircioglu@ku.edu.tr <p>The Uniqueness Thesis (U), defended by the uniquer and rejected by the permissivist, asserts that, necessarily, there is at most one rational doxastic attitude one can take towards a proposition, given a particular body of evidence. U faces a well-known, paralyzing objection from the permissivist, which I call “the simplicity objection,” which rests on the idea that evidence is not the sole determinant of rationality. In this paper, after maintaining that the ongoing dialectic between the uniquer and the permissivist has led to an exaggeration of differences, I bring into focus another, non-equivalent yet substantive (non-trivial) thesis in the vicinity, which I call “the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis” (U*), according to which if evidence is the sole determinant of rationality, then U is true. The hope is to achieve a rapprochement between the uniquer and the permissivist by showing that U* is true. To this end, I examine the argument Roger White offers in favor of U, which I call “the argument from evidential support” (AES), and argue that it is both unpersuasive for the defender of the simplicity objection and unnecessarily strong for establishing its own conclusion. I then offer a sufficiently weakened version of AES, which I call AES*, and argue that AES* is sound, if interpreted as an argument for U*.</p> 2021-12-31T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1248 Definition by Abstraction as a Method of the Empirical Sciences 2022-07-29T17:27:32+00:00 Igor Hanzel hanzel1@uniba.sk <p>In this paper, I analyze the structure of definition by abstraction employed in empirical sciences, whose specific feature is that it enables one to introduce a new magnitude on the basis of other, already known magnitudes. After reconstructing Aristotle’s and Archimedes’ treatment of the term “velocity,” I characterize in general terms the importance of this method for empirical sciences and address the nature of this definition drawing on Peano’s reconstruction. Next, I show that by means of that definition the magnitude mass can be introduced in classical mechanics, and the magnitude value in political economy drawing on the works of Ricardo. Then follows a critique of the nominalistic objections of Reichenbach and Dubislav against definition by abstraction. Finally, I show that this type of definition requires an in-depth semantic characterization, and this characterization should be based on the application of a hyperintensional semantic theory.</p> 2021-12-31T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1249 Some Philosophical Remarks on the Concept of Structure: Framing Michał Heller’s Perspective 2022-07-29T17:28:14+00:00 Michał Oleksowicz michaloleksowicz@umk.pl <p>Perceiving objects in a structural or relational way in the ontology of physics and mathematics, as opposed to the classical way, shows how the concept of structure remains crucial for contemporary philosophy of physics and philosophy of science. In this paper, a particular emphasis is placed on certain philosophical concepts proposed by Michał Heller, concerning the context of the structural understanding of theories and the world. The first aim is to provide a general critical survey of the main assumptions of structural realism (SR). The second aim is to interpret Heller’s philosophy of structure in accordance with the principal tenets of SR, illuminating certain criticisms of Heller’s approach. Having analyzed Heller’s approach, a question arises concerning the type of dependence on structuralism in the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mathematics, in addition to certain metaphysical assumptions regarding the concept of structure. It is argued that Heller’s SR conflates the adoption of mathematical structures in theories (the case of the realism–anti-realism debate) with the debate on mathematical explanations and the explanatory role of mathematical constraints.</p> 2021-12-31T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1250 Twardowski i przygodna przyszłość. Prawdopodobieństwo kontra Cienka Czerwona Linia 2022-07-29T17:28:52+00:00 Jakub Węgrecki jakub.wegrecki@gmail.com <p>One of the most widely discussed philosophical issues is the problem of future contingents. Basically, the challenge is to create an adequate semantic theory of future-tensed sentences. Twardowski (1900) suggests that future contingent statements should be analyzed using the concept of probability.<br>The aim of this paper is to show that (1) such an analysis is not appropriate and (2) that Twardowski’s main theses imply the Thin Red Line Theory. I discuss three potential arguments against my proposal and sketch the connection with Schaffer’s Parallelism Thesis (2012).</p> 2021-12-31T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1251 Davida Kaplana metafizyka słów 2022-07-29T17:29:23+00:00 Maciej Głowacki m.glowacki6@uw.edu.pl <p>This paper presents the fundamental problems of metaphysics of words and reconstructs David Kaplan’s intentional metaphysics of words. I critically analyze Kaplan’s proposal and present the most important objections. I also propose some possible answers to the objections.</p> 2021-12-31T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement##