TY - JOUR AU - Omyła, Mieczysław PY - 2020/10/31 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Aksjomat Fregego JF - Filozofia Nauki JA - FN VL - 28 IS - 3 SE - Artykuły DO - 10.14394/filnau.2020.0017 UR - https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1164 SP - 99-109 AB - <p>This paper discusses the semantic assumption that Roman Suszko called “the Fregean Axiom.” According to the Fregean Axiom, a logical sentence is a name of its logical value, which means that all true sentences are names of one and the same object called “Truth,” and — by analogy — all false sentences are names of one and the same object called “False.” The Fregean Axiom is at odds with the common-sense intuition. Usually, we think that a sentence is not a name but an<br>expression that states that a certain state of affairs occurs. The article analyzes the presuppositions underlying the axiom. The second part of the text discusses the consequences of either adoption or rejection of the axiom.</p> ER -