@article{Omyła_2020, title={Aksjomat Fregego}, volume={28}, url={https://www.fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1164}, DOI={10.14394/filnau.2020.0017}, abstractNote={<p>This paper discusses the semantic assumption that Roman Suszko called “the Fregean Axiom.” According to the Fregean Axiom, a logical sentence is a name of its logical value, which means that all true sentences are names of one and the same object called “Truth,” and — by analogy — all false sentences are names of one and the same object called “False.” The Fregean Axiom is at odds with the common-sense intuition. Usually, we think that a sentence is not a name but an<br>expression that states that a certain state of affairs occurs. The article analyzes the presuppositions underlying the axiom. The second part of the text discusses the consequences of either adoption or rejection of the axiom.</p>}, number={3}, journal={Filozofia Nauki}, author={Omyła, Mieczysław}, year={2020}, month={paź.}, pages={99–109} }