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THE MODEL OF A CITIZEN IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM (1946)

Relatively recently, sociologists and theoreticians of culture have paid proper attention to the importance of personal models in shaping the culture of a given social group in a given period. Every group of people harbors a certain model of a person or certain models that constitute the aim the members of the group strive for. Without understanding these models, it is hard to understand the culture modeled on them, just as it is hard to understand contemporary English culture if we forget it was shaped under the suggestion of the still valid model of a gentleman, which an average Englishman wants to resemble in terms of dressing, behavior, and inner life. Certain general models set the tone for the whole large *époques* that they grew out of. We ascribe the creation of the model of a warrior from Homer's epic to Ancient Greece. Greek philosophers of that time also worked out the model of a thinker, which still appeals to the imagination. Rome imposed on the later periods the model of a citizen (*civis romanus*). The Middle Ages shaped the model of a knight in reference to the ancient model of a warrior. The model of a saint emerged from the ascetic activity of the first centuries of Christianity. We owe to the Renaissance the model of a courtier. The growing middle class of modern times has grown out of the suggestion of a reliable burgher. Contemporary America aspires to the type of person who is able to ensure his prosperity with his own entrepreneurship and ingenuity (the self-made man). Soviet Russia presents the model of a shock worker who loves to work and who strives to inspire his comrades with his passion for productive action for the community.

We hold certain models in our minds; we would like to look a specific way and resemble certain people without even realizing it. These models change multiple times throughout our lives, influenced by books or contact with new,

attractive people. Someone who might want to become a Don Juan in their youth may want to be a sage later in their life. We try on models like an actor tries on roles in his imagination, and often pay tribute to many at the same time.

The pressure of certain models is clearly visible in what is called in Polish *brązownictwo* (“bronzing,” glamorizing), which is a process of retouching the public image of a person, usually a deceased one but sometimes someone living, so that the image is adjusted to the model that can be generally respected. The direction that the retouching takes teaches us what values were respected by the person who, often in good faith, committed forgery to a smaller or greater degree in the name of their preferences and the good of others.

For instance, traces of love affairs are removed carefully from the bibliography of a great scientist. Apparently, in the glamorizer’s view, only a certain type of erotic life befits a scientist. Someone else hides apostasy in a biography of a statesman. Apparently, being religious was a necessary attribute of this model of a statesman. The sister of a famous French poet censors his letters after his death. She puts additional zeros at the end of sums of money in her brother’s bills included in his correspondence, so they look more impressive. Thus, some degree of wealth must be part of her personality model. An author of a biography of a great actress and artist, Helena Modjeska, turns her from a woman living her life to the fullest and with vigor to a certain Marynia Połaniecka,¹ breathing with slogans “God” or “Fatherland.”

Collecting information on such numerous falsifications perpetrated by people who wanted to fit someone to their ideal model is incredibly educational for a researcher of personal models. Unfortunately, in many cases, it is hard to get to the truth and discover differences between the image and the original.

The concept of a personal model should not be confused with related concepts, such as the concept of a stereotype introduced by the American sociologist, Walter Lippmann. There is a specific stereotype of an academic, an old maid, a Jew, etc. An academic is generally perceived as clumsy, absent-minded, pure of heart, and with a certain naivety. We usually imagine him with a beard and wearing glasses. These properties, usually ascribed to an academic in a given environment, form the stereotype. According to a stereotype, an old maid is a wizened woman with an impoverished emotional life, prone to loss of mental balance as a result of her insatiability, inclined to take against people for whatever she herself has not experienced.

It seems that a stereotype collects certain noticed features, but it does not constitute an object of aspiration that may go beyond experience, the way a

¹ This is one of main characters of Henryk Sienkiewicz’s novel *The Polanieckis Family*.

personal model does. A stereotype solidifies fast and has the tendency to fall behind in relation to reality. Old maids today are unlike old maids in the late nineteenth century, when the only area in which a woman might have found satisfaction was erotic and family life. However, the relevant stereotype is still there as it is inflexible. The academic may have abandoned the beard long ago, and his integration into social life helped him get rid of some characteristic features he had when he was distancing himself from everyday life, isolated in his scientific visions, but he still has to carry his stereotype, like clothes he has outgrown, often unwillingly.

Social groups have their models, their stereotypes, their heroes. A hero is always a specific person, mythical or real, and if real, then usually dead and legendary. A personal model may be devoid of any individual features, although a specific person may be one, as Christ was a model for Thomas à Kempis. A hero may, but does not have to, become a model. The heroic life of Heracles became a model in the chivalric romance novels of the Middle Ages, but Joan of Arc, who played the role of a French national hero, never played the role of a personal model in her country. Thus, the scopes of personal models and of heroes are at odds.

Personal models perform different functions for different people, or for the same person at different stages of their lives. People aspiring to become saints have taken that aspiration so far at times that they broke their family ties and neglected their civic duties, only in order to become more similar to a certain model that did not require them to respect such obligations. Others are not eager to upend their whole personal life for perfectionist aspirations. These aspirations may be stronger in a person's youth than in the later stages of the same person's life. There is a common opinion that getting involved strongly with a specific model inevitably leads to some form of egoism. This opinion is not correct. It all depends on the character of the model that shapes a person. If the model is the type of person completely devoted to selfless actions, the effort to repeat this model in one's own personality does not at all entail such consequences.

Models can be adopted ready-made; their presence can be detected and found in various materials. They can also be designed. The tasks we pose here for ourselves will belong to the second category, as we want to design and discuss a certain model for a person living in the democratic system. The use of the word "democratic" forces us to explain certain issues. Without getting into enumerating all the proverbial ambiguities of the term, let us assume provisionally that by "democratic system" we mean a system in which there are no oppressed people and oppressors, no privileged and handicapped people, and a system in which the greatest possible number of citizens is engaged

in shaping the common life, a system in which everyone can take advantage of opportunities in the atmosphere of freedom. Speaking of privileged or handicapped people, we mean any type of privilege or handicap, not only in the economic sense. Democracy in this interpretation will exclude the existence of any first- or second-class citizens, whether rich as opposed to poor or a majority as opposed to a national minority, people following one or another religion, men or women, etc.

Let us now consider what traits we would like to see in someone who lives in a society shaped this way.

(1) Someone who is supposed to have influence on the life of a community should have *perfectionist aspirations*, encompassing both improving community life and also working on self-improvement. In order to improve, one must know what one wants, what is important and what is unimportant, what one can resign from when there is a conflict of goods, and what should be insisted upon. This ability to choose requires some kind of a hierarchy of values. However, it does not have to be put into words very precisely. Very few people have that. It is enough when some inherent emotional dispositions constantly point out the direction of one's selection and endow one's evaluative reactions with consistency.

As we mentioned before, perfectionist aspirations are especially characteristic for the age of adolescence. This is when we usually display the willingness to self-improve and reform the world in our minds. Unfortunately, these aspirations die out in the period of professional stability. Psychologists sometimes mention the twenty-fifth year of life as the approximate time for settling down and solidifying. This is when an average person has already adapted to the conditions found around them. They cease trying to reform the world and believe their convictions to be formed. They do not criticize these convictions any longer. They seek the company of people who sustain their own self-satisfaction. They avoid those who may breach this peace of mind. Incidentally, this age, seen as a borderline, is estimated with a certain dose of optimism, as — when speaking of people in general — the psychologists mentioned before exclusively mean so-called intellectuals. People who spend less time in education usually set their views even sooner.

Older people tend to speak of the age of adolescence in a patronizing tone. However, who knows if this is not the age when we are the best, at least in some aspects? Therefore, let us not hesitate to include into our model of a democrat the creative chaos of that period, with its rebellious inability to accept evil, and let us bid the person we are portraying to carry this unrest in themselves until their death.

(2) *Open-mindedness* is a necessary property that allows us and our environment to progress. One must absorb new things and revise one's views, especially if the facts based on which these views were formed have changed.

People are often offended when told that they have changed. This reaction may have various psychological backgrounds. Often, telling someone that they have changed their views disguises the charge of opportunism: those who have never bent may say that bitterly to those who change opinions depending on where the wind blows. Telling someone, especially someone we have not seen for a long time, that they have changed, either physically or mentally, is rarely a compliment as people do not usually improve with age, as it was said earlier. Finally, admitting that we have changed our views on a given issue means admitting that we were once mistaken.

The open-mindedness that we demand from other people should be connected with the courage to admit a failure of this kind. This is another term for what is also called the plasticity of the mind, but it has nothing to do with the plasticity typical to opportunists, which can be observed so effectively in people who constantly adapt to the rotational ideology [*ideologia obrotowa*] proclaimed by their state propaganda. In our interpretation, the plasticity of the mind is the opposite of being a "numbskull" rather than being opposed to having "a strong backbone." In this interpretation, it is a symptom of power rather than weakness.

(3) In order to achieve one's perfectionist aspirations, one must not only have a receptive mind but also *self-discipline*. Self-discipline is ascribed to those who are prepared for *long-lasting effort*, who can impose on themselves this ability and are able to implement an action plan, prioritizing more important over less important things, even at the cost of some sacrifices. This discipline is always discipline in the name of *something*, which in turn reveals the need to have a hierarchy of values, strongly based on long-term emotions. Having such a hierarchy of values in combination with will and the ability to implement them and defend them from potential danger if necessary makes up what people call having *a strong backbone*.

(4) This strong backbone should be combined with *tolerance*. This word requires a comment to disperse doubts which may easily occur. Tolerance is often ascribed to someone who overlooks various offenses of others for the sake of peace of mind. This is not the kind of tolerance we mean. Tolerance in our interpretation is not failing to oppose things that we perceive as bad but the ability to respect other people's needs and opinions that we do not share. Respecting other people's needs means taking them into account in one's conduct and adapting one's own conduct to them; respecting other people's opinions means having a generally favorable attitude towards them, and in

the case of a clear controversy, not ascribing negative motivation to the opponent in advance only because one is opposed to this view.

It is often said that tolerance in this interpretation is a dangerous property, as understanding someone's standpoint leads to justifying it, which in turn freezes one's activity and is a threat to one's strong backbone, which we have just postulated.

Observation of people may lead us to review this opinion. At most, tolerance freezes certain *negative* impulses for action, but it does not touch positive ones. A forgiving person does not act based on indignation, condemnation, or hate when fighting against perceived evil, but rather, such a person acts based on attachment to what they perceive as right; based on the love for a specific vision of the world they aim to implement.

(5) *Activeness* [aktywność], which we demand of the person we describe, accomplishes the abovementioned perfectionist needs in reference to the person and the environment. We ascribe activeness to someone who, even with limited means, such as for instance in war prisoner camps, was able to put in some self-development: working on foreign languages, generally taking advantage of every opportunity to learn. Whoever moves into an abandoned house and soon gets down to work to get everything in working order, and will not rest until a door is fixed and closes properly, or a jammed lock turns smoothly, a rusty nail is removed, that person can be called active.

Activeness is not measured with the number of actions performed, because then we would have to count the mentally ill as particularly active, as they are often unable to sit still. It is always an action that somehow *improves* the living conditions in some way, an action leading to some advancement, whether it is an activity performed by someone who strives to improve their own material situation or someone who strives to free the world from exploitation. Passivity is accepting the world around us without trying to improve it.

(6) A person who takes part in public life, such as a citizen in a democratic system, needs courage, and specifically, the particular kind of courage that is called *civil courage*. We ascribe civil courage to those who present their beliefs and defend them even when this puts at risk issues of interest to them, even when they face the risk of being treated unkindly and slandered so that their careers are cut short. How common it is that fear of losing popularity or fear of arousing someone's aversion or anger works as a conservative force maintaining an ingrained prejudice that one should be courageous enough to contravene. Deeming someone courageous, we assume that the person realizes the consequences they will face, just as we speak of courage in the case of soldiers, when the person acting is aware of the danger, is able to experience fear, but can also control it. Some define courage as "conscious suppression

of fear and standing up against a dangerous situation in the name of personal or social values.”

We quote this definition because it reminds us again of the previously stressed importance of having a hierarchy of values, not necessarily a conscious one. A person who is brave risks something, and the risk is always *in the name of something*. The person would rather put at risk their position than continue to look on as injustice occurs around them; they would rather lose their peace of mind than be a passive witness to someone’s suffering. One must care about certain values deeply to rate them higher than one’s freedom or life. When a risky action lacks this sort of motivation, when it is hard to determine the values in the name of which the risky action is taken, besides *showing off*, we speak of *recklessness* rather than bravery.

(7) The next aspect without which our picture would be incomplete is *intellectual honesty*. This requires courage, as dishonesty of this type is a result of cowardice. “Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth — more than ruin, more even than death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority,” writes one contemporary English author.²

Someone who has no courage to follow their line of reasoning until its end, no matter the consequences, or someone who cannot live without self-deception, but uses it as a means of support to go through life more smoothly, sins against intellectual honesty. When self-deception is connected with pompous recitation, undeservedly lifting the person upwards, we speak of *mendacity* [*zakłamanie*] or, more insultingly, *hypocrisy* [*załganie*]. Holding on to absurd predictions in order to survive war more easily is self-deception but not mendacity, whereas the privileged classes telling themselves that they owe their privileges to their high intellectual and moral qualities is mendacity, and so is covering imperialist tendencies by claiming some sort of a noble cultural mission on the part of one’s nation.

(8) *Criticism* is necessary to achieve intellectual honesty, a disposition that totalitarian systems seek to eradicate, for good reason, and which is necessary in a democratic system, where a person should choose freely between different, equally valid standpoints. At present, having witnessed the mass intoxication performed by propaganda, there is no need to speak in favor of this position. A critical person is resistant to intoxication and obstinately demands *justification* rather than intoxication.

² B. Russell, *Why Men Fight: A Method of Abolishing the International Duel*, New York: The Century 1917, 178.

(9) Intellectual honesty and criticism are associated with another disposition that we cannot omit in this catalog. I mean *responsibility for words*. Responsibility for words comes in many varieties. In one of them, it is opposed to fibbing. When this fibbing is used to pretend that we are better than we are in fact, we speak of *bluffing*. In another form, responsibility for one's words is contrasted with unreliability, not keeping agreements and promises. A special case of lack of responsibility for one's words is lack of punctuality. Wiping out all of these flaws should be of high priority, as accusing Poles of them is, unfortunately, fully justified.

(10) Let us move on to the disposition of the greatest importance, which is commonly called *socialization*. We sometimes speak of socialization in such a broad sense that we should include responsibility for one's words in this interpretation of socialization. Then we mean all human qualities that contribute to peaceful coexistence. Yet the word "socialization" is more often interpreted more narrowly when socialization is discussed and this is the interpretation we are focusing on here. In this interpretation, socialization is also still a complex disposition, or to be more precise, a complex of dispositions. It is made up of the following factors:

(a) Being interested in social issues and a certain set of competencies in this field. Arousing and cherishing these kinds of interests, hitherto neglected in our upbringing, is a very important task of an educator in a democratic system. It is evident, after all, that young people, who will soon participate actively in governing their country, even if it is only through voting, should know what options for organizing communities exist, what forms of production and division of goods there are, what difficulties come with these sorts of issues and who is willing to counteract them and how.

Arousing social interest is also important for coexistence for more indirect reasons, which should not be underestimated. It is arousing *non-personal* interests; and non-personal interests, such as the interest in science or art, shape the human mind in a positive way; and when it comes to people's personal contact with the environment, they distract one's mind from trifles and prevent heavy nagging about other people's lives. As things stand, the lack of interest beyond one's own life and that of one's family is primarily characteristic of women. Naturally, arousing this sort of interest in them must be accompanied by providing them with an outlet for the aroused aspirations.

(b) Another factor contributing to socialization in the narrower sense is *overcoming the egocentrism* inherent to people. As we know, egocentrism is an intellectual defect that prevents people from approaching an issue from another person's point of view. This defect, especially common in children, persists in the mind of an adult as well. We all know people who cannot de-

scribe the plot of a book to someone who has not read it, partly because they cannot put themselves in the position of a person who does not know the plot at all. Every one of us has been “made happy” against our will by someone who inadvertently ascribed to us their own tastes and needs.

This seemingly harmless defect has, in fact, completely underestimated consequences in human relations, as it leads to *ignoring the interests of others*. We can easily claim that egocentrism, which does not *notice* other people’s interests, does as much harm in social life as egoism, which *notices* other people’s interests but chooses one’s own when conflicts of interest occur. As was noted above, training imagination is crucial for overcoming egocentrism.

(c) However, to be socialized, it is not enough to overcome this intellectual defect. One must be able to place oneself in the shoes of a wronged person when one’s own life is going well, but one must also be able to have certain emotional reactions that push one to help others, even if it puts at risk one’s personal interests, and thus, one must be *generous*. Generosity is well perceived not only when it is spontaneous and in a direct relationship between one person and another. It is also desired in an organized and preplanned form in order to achieve collective goals, as such generosity is required for *social service*, which a citizen in a democratic system should feel obliged to do.

The generosity of the first kind does not have to entail the generosity of the second kind. During the occupation,³ there were a lot of people who always happily fed a hungry child knocking on their door or who gladly hosted someone who had no roof over his head, but they did not feel obliged to join the common fight with the locusts who attacked the community or to cooperate in organizing future Polish community life freed from these locusts. Some lived in the blissful belief that it is enough when everyone does what they should in their small private circle for the whole to work. Others thought that the existence of people who devote themselves to public life is necessary, but they did not think to count themselves among them, believing that there are people who are somehow especially predestined to it. Those who devoted themselves to public service face various kinds of treatment: beginning from respect, or even reverence, ending with weary tolerance, like for people who disturb other people’s peace and ask for trouble.

Both of the mentioned kinds of generosity are needed, and we especially value those who combine the ability to sacrifice with the *sense of responsibility for the life of a community* in social service and do not ask why they should undertake this social service, but rather, they ask why they should avoid it.

³ Ossowska refers here to the years of World War II when Poland was occupied by Nazis and Soviets.

(d) The social service we just mentioned necessarily requires the fourth and last factor, included in socialization: *the ability to cooperate*. People are usually not called socialized if they cannot perform an action as a team, who are not interested in scouting or team sports in their youth, and who later avoid joining a trade union or a political party. Someone is not socialized if they feel bad when their profession forces them to perform work in a team, where they are supposed to be only part of the team rather than the leader.

The Polish tradition of *liberum veto* makes us add another remark at this point on how it is necessary to distinguish individualism from brawling.

A system that respects people's individualism respects people's aspirations for *personal* improvement according to their own models rather than those imposed by the state and identical for all; it is a system that respects personal freedom, the freedom of opinion, and a *private sphere*. Individualism expressed in the feeling that one *has the right* to demand this kind of respect is a property that should be available to all. Yet it is not desirable to have individualism interpreted as the inability to cooperate with others *based on equal rights for everyone*. Even more so, it is unacceptable to display the tendency to deliberately damage this cooperation if it does not go one's way, like children do who do not want to play if they do not lead, and moreover, spoil the fun for all that still want to play. Not submitting to the rules of teamwork and deliberately damaging the work of the team falls under *brawling*, which must be exterminated methodically due to the existence of the aforementioned Polish traditions.

(11) When painting the picture of the person we mean to breed, we cannot fail to bring up another, very important point — that is, the standpoint to be taken against an opponent in a fight, as a fight is a common situation. It does not only happen at war. It is also a strife in the parliament, any polemic, a game of chess, or a tennis match.

A fight should be conducted according to old chivalric traditions, with respect for the opponent and, as some repeat persistently, avoiding any harm that is not necessary for reaching a goal. This chivalric tradition is especially important today, in these times when people try to crush their opponent by any means necessary; when the enemy's death is not sufficient; when the enemy's image must also be defiled for posterity. Slandering the enemy was a well-known method of German propaganda. The *chivalry* that we demand is not only demonstrated in the course of a fight. Its rules also teach us how to win and lose. Every English youth taking part in a sports competition knows that it is unacceptable to gloat when they win and show disappointment and anger when they lose. In their rules of *fair play*, English ethics have achieved a level that is worth imitating.

(12) Besides all of the abovementioned qualities, a person who can be treated as a model is also expected to have *aesthetic sensitivity*. Aesthetic sensitivity is prescribed not only because it greatly enriches our personal lives even when we are only consumers of beauty but also because it enriches human cultural legacy when we manage to produce rather than only consume. It is also recommended due to its moral effects.

The moral and aesthetic spheres are so closely connected that it is impossible to delineate clear borders between a moral and an aesthetic reaction. When we work on ourselves, the model we strive for is aesthetically attractive to us. When we do not succumb to cowardice or jealousy, it is often because we do not want to tarnish our image with an “ugly” feeling or action. It is therefore hard to decide what is a moral reaction and what is an aesthetic one. Aesthetic culture does not guarantee ethical culture, but it favors it since, because the line between good and evil is unreliable, deciding whether to perform a given action may often be exclusively a matter of taste.

There are also those who prescribe developing an aesthetic position because it allows us to enjoy an object without having to own it. In order to admire the beauty of a forest or the beauty of a Rembrandt painting, one does not have to own them. Our desire to possess is suspended in the aesthetic position and therefore, this position does not lead to conflict in the way competing for goods that provide joy only when owned does.

(13) Our person, the way we want to see them in the democratic system, requires one more feature in this image. They should have a *sense of humor*. There is something to the view that a nation that has this property is not prone to accepting dictatorship. In order to convince people that one person or one party has the monopoly on truth and has the exclusive right to shape all citizens according to it, without allowing for deviation, this authority should be supported with some declaration. We know how effectively one good humorous magazine or one joke transferred “from mouth to mouth” can dispel the vapors of such pomposity. Let our person of the future have this ability, which Aristotle used in defining man: let them be able to laugh.

To conclude, let us add a broader historical background to this model of a citizen and ask about the most important differences between it and the leading models of the past.

The model of a wise person and the model of a saint were elite models. Only a very few people could aspire to achieve them. The model of a knight was a class model. So was the model of a gentleman. The latter underwent constant democratization, associated with growing disregard for the issue of descent and stronger domination of personality, but still, until recently, only a certain level of life and only some sorts of professions, if any at all, gave

people the right to be included in the class of gentlemen. Our model is not elite or class-based. Anyone can take it as a basis on which to shape themselves. Another characteristic worth stressing is that it includes both men and women. Shaping personal models has hitherto wronged women. Their models were not very varied. Some variety was associated with the age the models referred to (they were different for a girl and a matron), or the varied amount of education desired for women, but apart from that, it was always innocence before the wedding and faithfulness after the wedding, which were sufficient virtues to lead a quiet domestic life, according to the requirements placed before wives by Pericles, who stated that "The best wife is one which is least spoken of, whether well or badly."

In terms of the model of a knight, the model of a gentleman deriving from it, and the model of a saint, intellectual factors come to the fore. There were saints who combined sainthood with wisdom, such as Thomas Aquinas, or Catherine of Siena who, according to legend, settled the most complicated theological disputes, but they were exceptions. Intellectual qualifications were never particularly valued in the model of a saint. Excessive development of intelligence was even a threat to a gentleman, who was supposed not to distinguish himself with anything, even his mind, and who should not inquire or play a wise guy too much. The flexibility of the mind, the criticism, which we require from a citizen who meets our criteria for the model, would not be welcome in the list of a gentleman's features, and intellectual honesty would find itself there only because it is honesty.

In comparison to the model of a saint, our model downplays the role of the relationship to issues of sexuality, a characteristic of great importance in the former model, in the form of specific involvement in the fight against Satan's temptation. When issues of sex were burdened with the stigma of sin regardless of the circumstances, they were especially important in tending to one's own perfection. Nowadays, when the stigma of sin is gone, their importance is measured by the joy they bring or harm they may do someone, and managing such a great resource of potential joy and suffering should be entrusted to our social skills and our sense of aesthetics. We speak of the sense of aesthetics, as erotic life is one of the areas where moral issues are intertwined with aesthetic issues. Experiencing distaste, which is often the case in the sphere of eroticism, may serve as an example of a mixed reaction of an aesthetic-moral character. For such common points, not only caring about others but also a sense of aesthetics is necessary for those who would like to avoid harm and shock.

In the model of a decent person established by bourgeois ideology, financial solidity was the most important feature, and the bookkeeping-assurance

style [*styl buchalteryjno-asekuracyjny*] infiltrated the entire model. In our model, financial solidity constitutes one of the variants of the required responsibility for one's words and as such will be necessary, but not sufficient, to secure moral authority. In turn, the assurance point of view, characteristic for the model of a burgher, well-known from slogans, is associated with the economy, in which people are absorbed with their private gain or loss, and it is not encountered in the social economy, within which our citizen is to live and act.

In comparison to most models worked out in the past, our model gives more weight to socialization, which can be easily explained when we take into consideration that we made it for a system that drags the largest crowds possible into organizing the life of a community. We felt the closest in that aspect to the Roman model of a citizen, which had been favored by the Commission of National Education.⁴

What we have outlined is not in any sense a finished description, but only a draft. Conscious of its misgivings, we would still like to sketch out an idea to create a point of departure for a discussion that might push the matter forward. When outlining the idea, we only took into consideration fundamental features, excluding derivatives, but it was often difficult to determine what kind of property is meant, the difficulty of which is exacerbated by the ambiguity of the terms used, necessarily deriving them from ordinary language and mostly not yet organized by science.

The list of properties making up our personal model did not include the relationship of a citizen to the state. This is not an omission. We simply did not feel the need to expand on this topic, as we put the issue into a broader perspective, discussing human behavior in *any* human organization, therefore including one called a state. A socialized person in the sense we adopted would be socialized *in any group*, either some local group, such as a local government, or in a group with a wider reach. The state-building verbalism we were fed before the war, following the example of totalitarian states, is necessary where one wishes to convince the citizens that they are only pawns working for the state; however, it is superfluous in a system where the state unifies, organizes, and coordinates, but does not require anyone to worship it like a deity.

*Translated by Katarzyna & Glen Cullen.
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⁴ The Commission was established by the Polish parliament in 1773.